what is going on in someone else's mind. Montaigne asserts, on the contrary, that we can never know; all we have are "uncertain conjectures." The questions raised by these quotations, such as "Do we ever really know what others are thinking and feeling?"or "How do we know?" lead to other, related questions: Can two people have the same pain? Do we know anything apart from our own mental experiences? What is the self? Can there be a private language? Such questions are not only of interest to philosophers; they also enter the realm of the novelist, and certain of them are especially relevant to the study of Proust. Just as the province of poetry seems to be that of the "inner world," so the province of the novel is that of interpersonal relationships.' Plots of novels involve characters seeking to discover, usually with at least partial success, what other characters really feel and think. Clearly at the core of Proust's The Captive is the attempt to explore "that unknowable thing which, when we seek to form a definite idea of it, another person's life invariably is to us."' It is not surprising that so many novels deal with a love situation, where the feelings of others (of one other) are of paramount importance. A happy ending, as in Pride and Prejudice or David Copperfield, often consists in one character finally revealing his or her love to another. And jealousy, as presented by Proust, is the situation in which characters are driven to doubts about their knowledge of the beloved's feelings. Both Swann (in Swann in Love) and Marcel find themselves looking up from the street at the lighted window of their beloveds' rooms, an emblem of their sense of being shut out from their lives, which they can only deduce from a distance, from shadows. On the level of narration, the question of point of view or narrative perspective is that of the means of representing what characters perceive or think. On yet another level, Proust goes so far as to assert that only in art can we see something of the inner lives of others: art makes the ineffable .appear, "rendering externally visible in the colours of the spectrum the intimate composition of those worlds we call individual persons and which, without the aid of art, we should never know" (p. 348).3
In Remembrance of Things Past, then, Proust not only comes to grips with the question of how to represent, as well as to form an idea of, another person's life, he also thematizes this problem in the course of the work. Nowhere is this clearer than in The Captive, whose subject is the narrator's attempt to delve into the character of Albertine, to circumscribe her. Ci).cumscribe comes from the Latin circum ( around) + scribere (to write), and the OED gives several definitions 2 Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1984] , Art. 5 https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol8/iss2/5 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1141 of the term. It means, first, to draw a line around, to encompass, to encircle; second, to enclose within limits, to limit, bound, confine, and also to mark off, to define; third, to describe (a figure) "about another figure so as to touch it at certain points or parts without cutting it"; and finally, to write or inscribe around. All these meanings are relevant to The Captive. In order to define Albertine, Marcel must confine her: if he can set the boundaries to her life, he feels he can form it into a kind of circle or whole which would then be possible to grasp, to comprehend. But to describe her, he must indeed make her into a kind of figure, a trope, not containing her, but merely standing for her life those races which make use of phonetic writing only after regarding the letters of the alphabet as a set of symbols; I, who for so many years had sought for the real life and thought of other people only in the direct statements with which they furnished me of their own free will, failing these had come to attach importance, on the contrary, only to the evidence that is not a rational and analytical expression of the truth; the words themselves did not enlighten me unless they could be interpreted in the same way as a sudden rush of blood to the cheeks of a person who is embarrassed, or, what is even more telling, a sudden silence. Some subsidiary word . . . bursting into flames at the unintended, sometimes perilous contact of two ideas which the speaker has not expressed, but which, by applying the appropriate methods of analysis or electrolysis I was able to extract from it, told me more than a long speech. (p. 111) Albertine wishes to deny that she wants to leave him, but that message is transmitted despite her through signs which are both verbal and non-verbal, but in both cases involuntary. Her lies are uncovered, and "certain words, certain gestures" on some occasions reveal the truth. These other signs include: involuntary facial expressions (cf. the "rush of blood" above); facts relevant to the other's actions, like the presence of Mlle. Vinteuil at the Verdurin's party, which seems to explain Albertine's desire to attend it; and actions-like Albertine's returning from the Trocadero concert in obedience to his wishes. As the quotation above indicates, such signs often prove more accurate than direct verbal ones. This other language, that of the face, of gesture, and of inadvertent words, is truly figural. A facial expression or a word stands for another message, rather than being referential, i.e., denoting a thing or a state of affairs. Thus, all forms of language, rather than bringing us closer to what we seek, giving us the object, take us another step away. And even this gestural, facial language does not lead us to the truth; it forms a closed whole which is as nonreferential as speech. Albertine's face often does not reveal what she thinks: "this immobility of even a light expression was as heavy as a silence; it would have been impossible to say that she blamed, that she Marcel, as shown in the quotation above, is put in the impossible position of the interpreter, the decoder of these signs. It is as though he were analyzing Albertine's actions as a scientist would his materials, studying the "residue" left on her face by her emotions (p. 476), taking them as symptoms (pp. 456; 536). The prevalence of imagery of reading and interpretation in this novel result, as J. Hillis Miller has pointed out, from this conception of character as sign.' Where there is reading, of course, there is also misreading: not only does the narrator inform us directly of errors in interpretation which he has made (often including prolepses of the time when he is to be undeceived); in addition, he often uses a structure of analepses paralleling the prolepses, in which new information leads him to rectify earlier impressions or to fill in gaps in his knowledge. The Fugitive is in large measure a reprise of The Captive and earlier volumes, a re-reading of the same material (Albertine's life) from new perspectives. As Genette has pointed out, this analeptic structure is that of Remembrance of Things Past as a whole. 9 The opacity of Albertine's character, constructed for the narrator through her lies, silences, and evasions, is created also for the reader by means of the narration of the novel. It has often been noted that Albertine is a mystery for the reader as well as for Marcel because we see her only from his point of view, and that the whether . . . whether and perhaps constructions imply that neither the narrator nor we can have more than a series of hypotheses regarding the motives of others.1° Indeed, the narrator admits it himself: "whether I was right to trust to that nature [his own feelings and motives] or on the contrary it did not corrupt Albertine's intentions instead of making them plain, that I find difficult to say" (p. 476). An exception to Albertine's silence, so to speak, is the intercalated note she writes to him when he has sent word that he would like her to return immediately from the Trocadero, to which he had earlier insisted that she go. That she will return (Francoise telephones him the news) seems to him proof that she belongs to him, but the note she writes and which gives him even more pleasure sounds patently insincere in its hyperbole and its protestations that nothing would be nicer than to rush home to him: thus, what seems to be written evidence of her attachment is rather a figure, replacing the real and opposite message, her falseness. Like irony or allegory, it is an invisible trope dependent on the receiver for its deciphering. Its intended receiver is unable to make it out.
All these contraventions of communication lead Marcel to a Cartesian conception of a person as comprising two realms of existence, an inner and an outer being, the first of which is known only to him or herself. The vertiginous feeling he experiences at the contemplation of the "abyss" created by her lies and their destruction of the idea of a stable reality leads him to the skeptical position that a person's inner life (like his or her past life) is necessarily closed to others: in Albertine's eyes he senses "regions more inaccessible to me than the sky, in which Albertine's memories, unknown to me, lived and moved. . . . I felt that there yawned like a gulf the inexaustible expanse of the evenings when I had not known Albertine." He can touch her body, but "I felt that I was touching no more than the sealed envelope of a person who inwardly reached to infinity. How I suffered from that position to which we are reduced by the carelessness of nature which, when instituting the division of bodies, never thought of making possible the interpenetration of souls" (pp. 526-27). The body, then, is a substance radically different from the mind; and Albertine is not only "the captive" of Marcel; her soul, like everyone's, is caught (in Plato's image) in the prison-house of the body. In the quotation above, the image of an envelope recalls the descriptions of Albertine sleeping-a being "enclosed in a human body" (p. 128). The pleasure he takes in watching her sleep, mentioned often and described in somewhat disturbing detail, is not only that of the jealous man not wanting to reveal his desire, nor does it arise solely from the fact that she cannot prevent her features from revealing what she feels; it comes largely from the fact that while she sleeps, she is in a sense absent from herself." The imagery used to describe her is that of plants, statues, and dead women. Though the narrator says that "I had that impression of possessing her altogether, which I never had when she was awake," (p. 85; see also p. 501), it is rather that she possesses herself as little as he possesses her.
These two philosophic stances with regard to the human mind, that it is separate from the body and that it is inaccessible to others, are interdependent, and they are both highly relevant to this novel: the prison of attentions and surveillance in which Marcel shuts Albertine turns out to be nothing compared to the one out of which she shuts him: his attempted intrusions into her mind are met with walls impossible to penetrate. Albertine is experiencing at any given moment; he wants to be certain, he wants always to be certain, and even more, he wants to have her experiences.
The desire to assimilate Albertine to himself is expressed in terms of two interlocking strands of imagery that underlie the novel: imprisonment and possession. In a novel of this title it is hardly necessary to stress the images of prison, captivity, cages, bars, closed doors, enclosed spaces, and so on, that run through the work. It is, however, an imagery which grows in frequency and intensity: whereas at first, it seems just that Albertine is living with the narrator, his increasing and increasingly desperate surveillance of her makes it progressively clearer that she is his captive and at the same time renders inevitable her desire to leave and her eventual "escape." Indeed, according to the narrator, love itself depends on the fear of losing the beloved, who is a "fugitive" and thus a "captive woman" (p. 118). At the same time, he is aware of the reciprocal nature of imprisonment: "I was more of a master than I had supposed. More of a master, in other words more of a slave" (p. 207). It is he who is controlled by Albertine, for the more she eludes him, the more he finds himself obsessed with the desire to know about her. Her deceptions are like those of a slave or a captive, and they reinforce his sense of possession, but by means of them he is sealed out of her life.
Deleuze shows that Marcel holds Albertine prisoner in order to explicate her, to empty her of her worlds (pp. 107-08). As such, he could know her and truly possess her. He is continually looking for signs in Albertine's behavior to indicate that she "belongs" to him. He buys her gifts of clothing and jewels because he wants to keep her happy in order to prevent her from leaving him, but also because when she wears the things he has bought, she is wearing the signs of his possession, and he has in a sense paid for her. He speaks of her repeatedly in terms of an objet d'art, something that can be collected; and the description of her own silver collection reinforces that image.
It is while she sleeps, when she has lost her conscious identity and become like Yet there is another side to the view of language evinced in such quotations. Indeed, it is often language which serves philosophers as the means of refuting the skeptic's claim for the radical alterity of others. In the ordinary language philospher's appeal to what we say and "the search for our criteria on the basis of which we say what we say," Cavell sees "claims to community," and he expresses our deep need for such certainty in saying that "the wish and search for community are the wish and search for reason" (p. 20) . This side is presented in Proust as well, as discussed below; but also the novel itself is a "memorandum block," that is, the transmission of the inner life of another person, Marcel himself. And despite his sense of failure in his attempt, as character and as narrator, in The Captive he has attempted to do the same for Albertine. His failure is his success: if nothing else, he has succeeded in transmitting our sense of being cut of from others, and he has figured the untenable but ineluctable position expressed by Wisdom when he writes: "Does the contradiction in the philosopher's request for perfect knowledge of others reflect a conflict in the human heart which dreads and yet demands the otherness of others?" ("Symposium," p. 229). Here, the desire to immobilize, to fix Albertine or Andree (for how can he grasp them unless they hold still?) is stymied by their movement, their passage. Not only are they others-the other, to himthey are always other than they were, that is, others to themselves. The cliché, as alike as two drops of water, is transformed here into always dissimilar drops of gold. The self, then, is intangible in its multiplicity; it dissolves into a ray of light, it"shatters in fragments" at our touch. Moreover, it is shown to be both linguistic and fictional in nature. It is this conception of the self which makes Marcel's task in The Captive inherently impossible, even inconceivable: there is an aporia between the necessary positing of the self, without which we could not imagine interpersonal relations or even languages at all, and the narrator's vision of the self as fragmented, almost illusory, and itself linguistic, or more precisely, tropological.
The exclamation "Alas! Albertine was several persons in one" (p. 463), conveys both her multiplicity and Marcel's sense of help-lessness in confronting it. Albertine is often described as a series of people. This multiplicity is both diachronic and synchronic (she has many past and future selves and there are many layers of her at any one time), both spatial and temporal; and it informs the narration of this volume: the more the narrator describes Albertine and her actions, the more the reader's impression of her becomes vague and fragmentary. The narrator returns again and again to his first impression of her among her friends at Balbec (and it is likewise of course the reader's strongest impression of her) when she was still simple to him. That moment is fixed and two-dimensional in his memory. The attempt to seize a ray of light, however, does not lead to a clearer image of it, but rather to a sense of loss at its elusiveness. Furthermore, part or parts of Albertine are entwined in the lives of other people; he speaks of her as "distributed among other people" (p. 483): his jealousy makes him try to prevent this seepage of her being into other lives; to confine her is to prevent parts of her from reaching his rivals. She is called "changeante," not only in the sense of being capricious but also elusive because she is constantly changing. She is repeatedly described as like this or like that (see especially p. 145); and the metaphors used to describe her convey the sense of her successive transformations, her metamorphoses from plant to flower to statue:
Had I not detected in Albertine one of those girls beneath whose envelope of flesh more hidden persons are stirring, than in . . . I do not say a pack of cards still in its box, a cathedral or a theatre before we enter it, but the whole, vast, ever changing crowd? Not only all these persons, but the desire, the voluptuous memory, the desperate quest of all these persons. (p. 119) Each of these successive selves is shut up, in a box, an envelope, or an edifice, and is inaccessible to others.
From the passage quoted at the beginning of this section, it appears that to speak about the self or a person at all is to speak metaphorically: it is a question of mere convenience. We give a name to the succession of selves that make up a person, and the act of naming is a purely arbitrary notation, an abstraction, a fiction. The proper name, often conceived of as pure reference and the very model of denotation, turns out to be metaphorical, or more precisely, what Fontanier would classify as a metaphorical catachresis, because it is "forced," i.e. there is no other word we could use.'6 As Marcel discovers at the Our last resource is to .. . boldly assert that these different related objects are in effect the same, however interrupted and variable. In order to justify to ourselves this absurdity, we often feign some new and unintelligible principle, that connects the objects together, and prevents their interruption or variation. Thus we feign the continued existence of the perceptions or our senses, to remove the interruption; and run into the notion of a soul, and self and substance, to disguise the variation."
Further, in Proust, the self is constituted, in yet another paradox, through that which has been shown to be altogether inaccessible, the other: through the other's language and through the unending mirroring of ourselves in the other. This position prefigures that of Lacan, according to whom the I is formed through the image of the child and others at his or her side reflected in a mirror: "We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image."' 9 The ego so formed is for Lacan, as for Proust, a fiction: "But the important point is that this form situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional direction" ( It is not only Albertine whom the narrator writes: he also writes himself. Indeed, the novel has often been characterized has the story of his becoming a writer; and his discovery of the continuity of his self through time in The Past Recaptured is simultaneous with his affirmation of his faith in literature -"letters." Proust has often been taken as claiming that the self is constituted through memory (cf. Bersani, p. 214); whereas it has been pointed out repeatedly since Locke's exposition of this theory that the concept of memory is itself dependent upon the concept of the self. Nonetheless, Proust does not seem to make a claim that runs counter to the point made by Hume in refuting Locke, that "memory does not so much produce as discover personal identity" (Hume, p. 34). It is language which makes memory possible, as Proust asserts when explaining Albertine's tendency to get her stories confused when she lies: "we remember the truth because it has a name, is rooted in the past, but a makeshift lie is quickly forgotten" (p. 190) . Such a connection between language, memory, and the self depends on a kind of Wittgensteinian view of the publicity of language. Wittgenstein puts into question the idea of a private language, pointing out that one could never be sure that a sign in one's language referred to the same thing today as yesterday; there could be no "criterion of correctness": "Always get rid of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you" (Investigations, p. 207, § 258). It is this possibility and this threat which is recognized by Berenger, the last man on Earth, in the passage from Rhinoceros quoted above: the impossibility of understanding and responding to others that Cavell calls the "fantasy of a private language" leads to the impossibility of understanding oneself.
Conceiving of others as inaccessible closed circles imprisons the skeptic within himself as much as it seals off others; and it leads not to a search for and in others, but to their rejection: "skepticism and tragedy conclude with the condition of human separation, with a discovering that I am I; . . . the alternative to my acknowledgement of the other is not my ignorance of him but my avoidance of him, call it my denial of him" (Cavell, Claim of Reason, p. 389). In the face of his own belief in the inaccessibility of others, the narrator is able to affirm the possibility of such acknowledgment, not only through art, but also through love:
And I became aware that Albertine was not even for me the marvellous captive with whom I had thought to enrich my home (for if her body was in the power of mine, her mind escaped from the grasp of mine) ... urging me with a cruel and fruitless pressure to the remembrance of the past, she resembled, if anything, a mighty goddess of Time. And if it was necessary that I should lose for her sake years, my fortune-and provided that I can say to myself, which is by no means certain, alas, that she herself lost nothing-I have nothing to regret. [Through the very pain she has caused him, she has] given me access beyond my own boundaries, upon that avenue which, private though it be, debouches upon the high road along which passes what we learn to know only from the day on which it has made us suffer, the life of other people. (pp. 527-28) He has been opened up to Albertine, though it is through a wound, and escaped the prison of his own selfhood. So it is that he cannot be a collector, pursuing or seeking to possess works of art or people; he sees, too, that Albertine cannot be his captive. And it thus becomes possible for him to find the road out of the self and the reaching out to others which is literature.
It is important, however, not to see such a passage as a resolution of the problems raised in The Captive: there can be no reconciliation between the conflicting views expressed by Proust on the radical alterity of the other and this possibility of union; of the self as a graspable entity and the self as fragmented and figural; of language as preventing communication and language as constituting the self and making communication possible. In maintaining these contradictions, Proust approaches the position of Wittgenstein as Cavell reads him, writing at another level from the philosophers who, since Descartes, seek knowledge as absolute certainty and who tend to deny the problem of skepticism and the threat to reason it represents by claiming that it does not exist or that it makes no sense. Proust, too, is writing in the face of the aporias inherent in his views of the self and the other: it is these impossibilities of which he writes.
